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The U.S. International Trade Commission: Import
Advertising Arbiter or Artifice?
Ross D. Petty*
I. Introduction
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 condemns:
[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation
of articles.., into the United States, or in the sale of such articles by
the owner, importer, or consignee, the threat or effect of which is -
(i) to destroy or substantially injure an industry in the United
States;
(ii) to prevent the establishment of such an industry; or
(iii) to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the
United States.'
This condemnation of unfair import competition was first enacted as
section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922.2 It was intended to give "more
adequate protection to American industry than any antidumping
statute the country has ever had" and to "prevent every type and
form of unfair practice."' 3 This language tracked the recommenda-
tions of an earlier report that compared the treatment of dumping by
Canada with the then criminal treatment of dumping by the United
States.4 This report distinguished dumping from other unfair trade
practices such as commercial threats, bribery, deceptive use of trade-
marks, passing off, exploitation of patents, false labeling, and decep-
tive advertising. 5 Thus, in passing the Tariff Act, Congress intended
"unfair methods of competition and unfair acts" to include deceptive
advertising.6  Since the passage of the Trade Act of 1974, which
substantially amended the Tariff Act, the U.S. International Trade
Commission has brought over 300 cases under this provision.7 Most
* Assistant Professor of Law, Babson College. The author wishes to thank the Bab-
son College Board of Research for financial support of this research.
1 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(l)(A) (Supp. 1991).
2 Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 318, 42 Stat. 943.
3 S. REP. No. 595, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1922).
4 United States Tariff Commission, DUMPING AND UNFAIR FOREIGN COMPE-
TITION IN THE UNITED STATES, Report to Committee on Ways and Means, House of
Representatives (Oct. 4, 1919).
5 Id. at 11.
6 Id.
7 The ITC has opened 327 unfair trade practice investigations under section 337.
Nearly all of these (320) have been at least preliminarily terminated. Investigations of Unfair
Trade Practices in the Import Trade (Fed-Track Guide)(May 31, 1991).
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of these cases involve intellectual property issues such as patent,
copyright or trademark infringement, or the theft of trade secrets.8
Others involve issues similar to trademark infringement such as pass-
ing off and trade dress misappropriation. 9 Relatively few involve
false advertising, and most of those concern a false designation of
country of origin.' 0 This Article discusses the use of section 337 of
the Tariff Act as authority for challenging false advertising generally,
not merely false designations of origin.
The modest use of section 337 to challenge the advertising of
imported products appears comparable to the limited use of section
43(a) of the Lanham Act in the years immediately following its pas-
sage in 1946."1 In fact, it was not until 1954 that a court first recog-
nized a claim of false advertising under the Lanham Act. 12 Not until
the late 1970s did the use of the Lanham Act to challenge false ad-
vertising become widely accepted.' 3 Today, more advertising cases
are litigated under the Lanham Act than by the Federal Trade
Commission. 14
This Article suggests that, like the Lanham Act during its early
years, the potential for section 337 as a means of challenging adver-
tising is largely unrealized. In a small effort to remedy this situation,
this Article explains its full potential and explains how it may be used
to challenge the advertising of imported products.
The following section provides background on other modes for
resolving disputes concerning the validity of advertising. It primarily
examines industry self-regulation, the Federal Trade Commission,
and private litigation under the Lanham Act for later comparison
with the International Trade Commission. 15 Part III of this Article
8 THOMAS V. VAKERICS, ET AL., ANTIDUMPING, COUNTERVAILING DuTv, AND OTHER
TRADE ACTIONS 488 (1987).
9 Id. at 495.
10 A recent study of the 269 cases filed before the ITC through September 1987
found that out of 596 allegedly unfair acts cited in the complaints, over 300 involved pat-
ent or copyright infringement and another 129 alleged trademark infringement. Passing
off/trade dress misappropriation was alleged 71 times, false designation of origin 60
times, but false advertising only 32 times. RobertJ. Thomas, Patent Infringement ofInnova-
tions by Foreign Competitors: The Role of the U.S. International Trade Commission, 53J. MARKET-
ING 63, 67 (Oct. 1989).
11 Bruce Keller, How Do You Spell Reliej? Private Regulation of Advertising Under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 227 (1985). "[T]he courts construed section
43(a) to require the plaintiffs to plead to prove the elements of a common law passing off
claim." Id. at 230.
12 L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
13 Keller, supra note 11, at 230-31.
14 Ross D. Petty, Supplanting Government Regulation with Competitor Lawsuits: The Case of
Controlling False Advertising, 25 IND. L. REV. (forthcoming 1991).
15 For comparison of industry self-regulation, the FTC, and the Lanham Act, see Ar-
thur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Comparative Study of Public Regulation, Industry Self
Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L. REV. 1 (1985). For a comparison of the FTC and
Lanham Act, see Petty, supra note 14; see also Ross D. PETTY, THE IMPACT OF ADVERTISING
LAw ON BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY (forthcoming, Quorum Books 1991).
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describes the International Trade Commission, its procedures, and
its advertising cases and decisions. Part IV discusses issues that the
case law has not yet addressed and the likelihood that the Interna-
tional Trade Commission will adjudicate more advertising cases in
the future.
II. Background: Other Modes for Challenging Advertising
A. Industry Self-Regulation
Perhaps the quickest means for a business to challenge a com-
petitor's advertising is to file a complaint with one of the many
sources of industry self-regulation. 16 Many industry trade associa-
tions have advertising codes, as do media and media associations.' 7
The National Advertising Division (NAD) of the Council of Better
Business Bureaus, for example, has actively investigated advertising
complaints since 1971.18 It is funded by dues paid to the Council of
Better Business Bureaus by advertisers and advertising agencies. 19
During 1983-85, forty-three percent of these complaints were from
business competitors. 20
Complaining to the NAD does not require a lawyer or the pay-
ment of filing fees. 2 ' In addition, the NAD acts quickly; it frequently
resolves complaints within six months of receipt.2 2 The NAD exam-
ines approximately one hundred complaints annually.23 Despite its
lack of authority to issue binding orders, the NAD has obtained a
discontinuance or modification of the advertisement in about sev-
enty-five percent of its cases, with the remainder of its findings vindi-
cating the challenged advertisement. 24
If the NAD cannot resolve the complaint to its own satisfaction,
the case may be appealed to the National Advertising Review Board
(Board).25 The Board is funded in the same manner as the NAD. It
has only decided forty-one cases that have been appealed to it out of
the more than 2,000 investigated by NAD since 1971.26 In sixty-six
percent of those cases, the Board upheld the NAD decision; in
twenty percent it reversed or modified the NAD decision; 27 and in
16 GORDON E. MIRACLE & TERRENCE NEVE-rr, VOLUNTARY REGULATION OF ADVERTIS-
ING 62 (1987).
17 Id. at 29-33.
18 Id. at 82.
19 Id. at 83.
20 Id. at 209.
21 Id. at 86.
22 Sixty four percent of all complaints in 1982 were resolved within six months. Id.
23 Id. at 209 (table 6-1).
24 It examined 107 complaints in 1986 and obtained discontinuance or modification
in 75% of them. Arthur Best, Monetary Damages for False Advertising, 49 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1,
38 (1987). For figures from 1980-84, see MIRACLE & NEVETr, supra note 16, at 216.
25 MIRACLE & NEvETr, supra note 16, at 86, 219.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 218(table 6-4).
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fifteen percent the case was dismissed or withdrawn.28 Advertisers
thus far have always complied with Board decisions decided against
them.29
The NAD's legal standards for determining whether advertising
is false or deceptive appear comparable to the Federal Trade Com-
mission's low standards discussed below.30 For example, in 1984 the
NAD took formal action on 105 complaints.3 ' Eighty percent of
these complaints questioned the adequacy of substantiation of claims
in the advertisements, and eighty-three percent challenged mislead-
ing statements or depictions.32
B. Federal Trade Commission
Commentators have suggested that the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC or Commission) has brought relatively few advertising
cases recently. 3 3 Since the FTC is free to decide whether or not to
take action in a particular case, a business cannot be confident that
the FTC will take effective or timely action in any particular case.34
When the FTC does decide to take action, however, the Com-
mission bears the expenses of discovery, litigation, and possibly set-
tlement negotiation. 35 Under section 5 of the FTC Act, it has broad
authority to condemn "unfair or deceptive acts and practices." '36
The FTC is able to use its own expertise to determine what claims
are made in the advertisement. 37 It then determines if the claims are
deceptive or unsubstantiated. To a lesser degree, the FTC also
28 Id.
29 Id. at 86-87. If the advertiser did not comply with the Board decision, procedures
call for referring the complaint to the FTC.
30 Id. at 91.
31 Id. at 226(table 6-8).
32 Id. The NAD also addressed children's advertising issues in 9% of its cases. Id.
33 See, e.g., Stanley E. Cohen, FTC Memo Hits Ad Self-Regulation, ADVERTISING AGE, 39,
42 (Feb. 7, 1983)("During a year when the ad industry self-regulation system identified
nearly 60 instances where national advertisers were making claims that could not be sub-
stantiated, the Miller management at the FTC failed to act against a single case involving
national ads that have run in major media since the present regime took office."); Thomas
J. McGrew, Advertising Issues Avoided by the FTC in Past Year, LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1985, at
12. See also Best, supra note 15, at 17 (the FTC's published decisions for 1982-83 contained
24 advertising cases). But see Joanne Lipman, FTC is Cracking Down on Misleading Ads, WALL
STREET J., Feb. 4, 1991 at 6; Kim Foltz, FTC Signals Its Concerns Over Deceptive Campaigns,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1991 at D-19(suggesting that the FTC under President Bush is more
active).
34 See, e.g., Moog Indus. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958)(FTC discretion to set enforce-
ment priorities); Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 873-74 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962)(deference to FTC expertise in deciding public significance of
enforcement actions).
35 Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. FTC, 594 F.2d 212, 214 (1979).
36 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1988). This authority was added after the Supreme Court de-
cided that under the Commission's authority to condemn "unfair methods of competi-
tion," the Commission must allege and prove competitor injury. See FTC v. Raladam Co.,
283 U.S. 643, 649 (1931); Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938).
37 See, e.g., J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884, 886 (6th Cir. 1967). This "intui-
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polices advertising that it deems to be unfair. 38
Under the FTC's Deception Policy Statement, an advertisement
would be considered deceptive if it contained a representation, prac-
tice, or omission likely to mislead reasonable consumers and if the
representation, practice, or omission was material to consumer
choice.3 9 Thus, the FTC can pursue omissions of material informa-
tion that should be disclosed to prevent the advertisement from be-
ing misleading.40
The major advantage of the FTC's deception authority is its rel-
atively low burden of proof. The FTC does not have to prove that
the advertiser intended to deceive consumers or knew its advertise-
ments were deceptive. 41 The FTC similarly does not need to prove
actual falsity of a particular statement. 42 Rather, it merely must
prove that reasonable consumers are likely to be misled by particular
tive approach" has been criticized. See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn, Proof of Consumer Deception
Before The Federal Trade Commission, 17 KAN. L. REV. 559, 565 (1969).
38 Under the FTC's unfairness jurisdiction and recent policy statement, it would pur-
sue advertising claims as unfair if they are likely to cause substantial consumer injury as
determined by the conduct's net effects and consumers could not reasonably avoid such
injury. Thus, in a situation where the omission of product information might harm con-
sumers, the FTC would require the disclosure of this information in advertising when the
costs to the advertiser, and ultimately purchasers, of doing so, would not outweigh the
benefits. Additionally, consumers must not readily be able to determine the missing infor-
mation by a simple examination of the product. Of course in many cases, the omission of
such information might also be deceptive.
For a brief explanation of the FTC's recent deception, unfairness, and advertising
substantiation policy statements, see Carol T. Crawford, Unfairness and Deception Policy at the
FTC: Clarifying The Commission's Roles and Rules, 54 ANTITRUST L. J. 303 (1985). The Com-
mission's Unfairness Policy Statement is appended to its decision in In re International
Harvester, 104 F.T.C. 949, 1072 (1984). See also Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair
Acts or Practices" In Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 GEO. L.J. 225 (1981).
The only examples of advertising that the FTC has challenged solely on unfairness
grounds involve depictions in advertisements that may influence children to engage in
dangerous activities. See, e.g., A.M.F., Inc., 95 F.T.C. 310 (1980)(consent order prohibiting
bicycle advertisements showing unsafe riding by children); In re Mego Int'l, 92 F.T.C. 186
(1978)(consent order prohibiting depictions of people using electrical appliances near
water); In re Uncle Ben's Inc., 89 F.T.C. 131 (1977)(consent order prohibiting depictions
of unsupervised children near active gas stove); In re General Foods Corp., 86 F.T.C. 831
(1975)(consent order prohibiting depiction of naturalist eating wild nuts and berries). Ac-
cord, In re Philip Morris, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 16 (1973)(consent order prohibiting placement of
sample of razor blades in newspapers where they might injure children).
The FTC has also challenged advertising as unfair and deceptive because of a lack of
substantiation of the advertising claims and or failure to disclose material information. See
Richard Craswell, The Identification of Unfair Acts and Practices by the Federal Trade Commission,
1981 Wisc. L. REV. 107, 116-27 (1981).
39 The FTC's Deception Statement is appended to its decision in In re Cliffdale As-
socs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984).
40 The so-called "pure omission," silence on a subject in circumstances that do not
give any particular meaning to the silence, can only be pursued under unfairness. See
Crawford, supra note 38, at 310-11; In re International Harvester, 104 F.T.C. 949, 1059-61
(1984).
41 Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1977); In re Travel King,
Inc., 86 F.T.C. 715, 773 (1976).
42 Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. FTC, 594 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1979).
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representations--even those representations that might be literally
true.43 In addition, the FTC does not need to prove actual decep-
tion caused by the advertisement.44 It only must show that the
claims are material to consumer choice and that consumers are likely
to be misled. 45 Certain claims, such as express claims and implied
claims made intentionally or concerning health, safety, efficacy, or
price, are presumed by the FTC to be material. 46
The second prong of the FTC's advertising regulation program
is its requirement that advertisers have a "reasonable basis" for their
advertising claims prior to making them.47 According to the 1984
Advertising Substantiation Policy Statement, claims that promise a
certain level of substantiation (e.g., "tests prove") must be sup-
ported by that level of substantiation. 48 Claims implying a high level
of substantiation to reasonable consumers must have the promised
level of substantiation. 49 For example, comparative claims, specific
performance claims, and claims with a scientific aura all imply that
tests were performed to substantiate them. All other claims must be
substantiated at a level determined by six factors: (1) type of claim;
(2) type of product; (3) consequences of a false claim; (4) benefits of
a truthful claim; (5) cost of developing substantiation; and (6)
amount experts feel is reasonable.50
The standard FTC remedy in an advertising case is a simple
cease and desist order.5' Should the company later violate it, it
would be subject to civil penalties.5 2 A cease and desist order typi-
cally prohibits claims that are false or misleading on their face as well
as other claims not containing a reasonable basis.53 The FTC often
specifies the type of reasonable basis. For example, drug efficacy
claims must be substantiated by well-controlled, double-blind
43 Some argue that the "likely to mislead" standard is a retreat from prior case lan-
guage requiring only "the tendency or capacity to mislead." See Patricia P. Bailey &
Michael Pertschuk, The Law of Deception: The Past as Prologue, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 849 (1984).
44 Trans World Accounts, 594 F.2d at 214; Resort Car Rental System, Inc. v. FTC, 518
F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
45 Trans World Accounts, 594 F.2d at 214.
46 Crawford, supra note 38, at 307.
47 In re Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 64 (1972). However, while announcing this new
doctrine, the Commission did not find Pfizer liable, so there was no basis for an appeal. Id.
at 73-74. For a discussion of the history of FTC's advertising substantiation program, see
Charles Shafer, Developing Rational Standards for an Advertising Substantiation Policy, 55 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1, 5-13 (1986).
48 In re Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 839 (1984), aff'd, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1289 (1987).
49 The policy statement is appended to the Commission decision in Thompson Medical
Co., 104 F.T.C. at 648.
50 Id. at 840. See also id. at 821.
51 Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90
HARV. L. REV. 661, 692 (1977).
52 See, e.g., United States v.J.B. Williams Co., 354 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd
in part, red in part, 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
53 Pitofsky, supra note 51, at 692.
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clinical tests. 54 In many cases, the FTC will also order affirmative
disclosures of information necessary to prevent deception. 55 Such
disclosures may be ordered for all advertising, often for a limited
period of time, or whenever a specified claim is made.56
Such remedies have been described as "pathetically inade-
quate," particularly when imposed after a long period of investiga-
tion and litigation. 57 According to one commentator, even if the
FTC sought a preliminary injunction in federal district court, a fifty-
two week advertising campaign would have run its course. 58 None-
theless, the FTC has obtained preliminary injunctions in advertising
cases. 59 To obtain such relief, the FTC must only prove a likelihood
of ultimate success on the merits in its underlying case.6°
Because of the limited value of injunctive relief, the FTC has
attempted to correct the effects of past practices by occasionally or-
dering corrective advertising. 61 In addition, under section 19 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC is authorized to seek con-
sumer redress for knowingly dishonest or fraudulent conduct that
violates a rule or order of the Commission.62 It has used this author-
ity to negotiate refunds to consumers in settlements of advertising
cases where feasible.63 These two remedies enhance the deterrence
value of FTC actions.
C. Lanham Act Litigation
Most commonly, business rivals challenge each others' advertis-
ing under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the Federal codification
of trademark law.64 Originally, trademark law only protected a busi-
ness from a rival's use of a similar trade name or mark where con-
sumer confusion appeared likely over the identity of the producer of
the goods in question.6 5 But section 43(a) allows injured parties to
sue firms that use "[any] false or misleading description of fact, or
54 Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. at 844.
55 Pitofsky, supra note 51, at 685.
56 Id.
57 See id. at 692-93.
58 Pitofsky, supra note 51, at 693 n. 128. Complaints against three marketers of over-
the-counter analgesics were issued in 1973, but appeals of the final FTC orders did not
occur until 1982 for one and 1984 for the other two. See Sterling Drug Co. v. FTC, 741
F.2d 1146, 1148 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984).
59 E.g., FTC v. Pharmtech Research, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 294 (D.D.C. 1983).
60 Id. at 299 (citing FTC v. Weyerhauser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
61 See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 950 (1978).
62 15 U.S.C. § 57(b) (1988).
63 See, e.g., In re Champion Home Builders Co., 101 F.T.C. 316 (1983); In re Mid City
Chevrolet, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 371 (1980).
64 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982).
65 Copyright law protects a business from having its advertising copied ("substan-
tially similar" unless under a "fair use" exception) by a rival. See KENNETH A. PLEVAN &
MIRIAM L. SIROKY, ADVERTISING COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 269-95 (1988).
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false or misleading representation of fact, which ... in commercial
advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities .... "66 Some early cases
interpreted prior language to require the plaintiff to prove the de-
fendant was "passing off" its goods as being those of the plaintiff,
but modem interpretations apply this language to cover all sorts of
false or misleading advertising.67
An obvious difference between bringing a private Lanham Act
case and complaining to the FTC or NAD is that the complaining
firm must bear the cost and burden of pursuing the lawsuit in a pri-
vate action.68 This includes proving that its rival's advertising actu-
ally is false or misleading. 69 Thus, a plaintiff, unlike the FTC or
NAD, cannot simply say that the claims are unsubstantiated and win
relief.70 Of course, in cases where the advertising explicitly or im-
plicitly promises that its claims are supported by proper evidence,
the plaintiff may prove falsity by showing a lack of substantiation. 7'
The plaintiff's burden of proving falsity is far from insurmounta-
ble. The plaintiff must prove that the false statements either have
deceived or have the capacity to deceive a substantial segment of the
audience, that the deception is material to the purchasing decision,
and that the plaintiff is injured or is likely to be injured by the state-
ment.72 When fifteen percent of the audience interprets the adver-
tising in a deceptive way, the courts become concerned.73 Courts
also have held that literally true claims may be "false" under the act
66 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
67 See generally, Ross D. Petty, Competitor Suits Against False Advertising: Is Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act A Pro-consumer Rule or an Anticompetitive Tool?, 20 U. BALT. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 1991).
68 See Keller, supra note 11, at 228. The Lanham Act creates a private right of action
for businesses harmed by, among other things, false advertising. Id.
69 Id.
70 See, e.g., Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222 (3d
Cir. 1990); Toro Co. v. Textron, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 241, 253 (D. Del. 1980)(plaintiff must
prove actual falsity, not merely lack of substantiation). But see, Johnson &Johnson v. Qual-
ity Pure Mfg., 484 F. Supp. 975, 983 (D.N.J. 1979)(injunction of defendant's claim made
"without a good faith basis, grounded on substantial pre-existing proof, to support it.").
71 See, e.g., Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 277-78 (2d Cir.
1981); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 785, 803
(S.D.N.Y. 1977)(efficacy claim proven deceptive because the weakness of the supporting
evidence should have led to a weaker claim of efficacy), aff'd, 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1978).
72 E.g., Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. I11. 1974).
73 Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 1091, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1982); PLEVAN & SmOKY, supra note 65, at
9. The FTC reportedly considered a similar standard for its deception policy statement
instead of the reasonable consumer test in the statement. See Bailey & Pertschuk, supra
note 43. Early FTC cases also have considered this issue. See, e.g., In re Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 461-62 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1112 (1973); In re I.T.T. Continental Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865 (1973)(10-14% is
deceptive); In re Benrus Watch Co., 64 F.T.C. 1018, 1032 (1964)(14% is deceptive); In re
Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 49 F.T.C. 263, 283 (1952)(9% is deceptive).
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when they are misleading.74
Judges ease the plaintiff's burden by frequently interpreting the
meaning of the express claims within the advertisement without re-
quiring evidence of how consumers would interpret them. 75 Of
course, other judges acknowledge their lack of expertise in this area,
as compared to the FTC, and require evidence of consumer interpre-
tation.76 The lack of expertise argument is supported by occasional
cases where the court of appeals interpreted the express claims in
advertising in a way diametrically opposed to the district court's in-
terpretation. 77 The traditional rule for implied claims is to require
evidence of consumer interpretation. 78
Two major advantages that mitigate the Lanham Act's added
burden of proof are the speed in which courts resolve these cases
and the remedies they impose. 79 Under the Lanham Act, a competi-
tor's advertising may be enjoined within "months or even weeks" of
its beginning.80 Often cases are essentially over after a preliminary
injunction is issued.8'
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must
prove that (1) he will likely win the lawsuit because the advertising is
false, (2) the defendant's advertising is likely to cause or have caused
injury to the plaintiff, and (3) the plaintiff's injury without the injunc-
tion is likely to be higher than the defendant's injury with the injunc-
tion (balancing of the hardships). 82 In contrast, the FTC must only
prove the first element.83
Proving likelihood of injury caused by the advertisement in
74 See, e.g., Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 782 F.2d 381, 386 (2d Cir.
1986); American Home Prods. Corp. v.Johnson &Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165-67 (2d Cir.
1978).
75 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 313, 317 (2d Cir. 1982);
American Brands, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
76 E.g., American Home Prods. Corp., 577 F.2d at 172 n.27; Proctor & Gamble Co. v.
Chesebrough-Pond's Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1082, 1094 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 747 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.
1984); American Brands, Inc., 413 F. Supp. at 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
77 See, e.g., Avis Rent A Car System, 782 F.2d at 384-86; Fur Info. and Fashion Council,
Inc. v. E. F. Timme & Son, Inc., 501 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1974). Cf., Coca-Cola Co., 690 F.2d
at 312 (court of appeals finds facial falsity where district court finds ambiguity); Bose Corp.
v. Linear Design Labs., Inc., 467 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1972)(court of appeals held three of
four claims were mere "puffing", district court had not ruled).
78 E.g., Coca-Cola Co., 690 F.2d at 317; American Home Prods., 577 F.2d at 165; PLEVAN
& SIROKY, supra note 65, at 415-16. But see, Tambrands, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 673
F. Supp. 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot-Coupe Int'l Corp., 580 F. Supp.
634 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)(defendants advertising implied claims enjoined without consumer in-
terpretation evidence).
79 Keller, supra note 11, at 243.
80 Id. at 243-44 and the cases cited therein at 243 n.99.
81 Id. at 244.
82 PLEVAN & SMiOKY, supra note 65, at 23-28. If the challenged conduct has ceased
with no reasonable probability that it will be resumed, the court may refuse to issue and
injunction. Id. at 28.
83 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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question is relatively straightforward in injunction cases.8 4 It is pre-
sumed in cases involving explicit comparative advertisements and
can otherwise be proven by establishing direct competition between
the plaintiff's products and the defendant's advertised product.8 5
Proving injury in cases where damages are sought is more difficult.8 6
A court may require proof of lost sales actually caused by the defend-
ant's advertisement.8 7 Presenting such proof may expose the com-
plainant to broad discovery of its sales figures and planning
documents by its rival.88 Damages, when awarded, have typically
been $678,000 or less, but damages in the amount of $40 million
were recently awarded in the case of U-Haul Int'l v. Jartran, Inc. 8 9
Lanham Act cases occasionally involve more unusual remedies.
Just as the U-Haul court awarded damages based on the corrective
advertising that U-Haul disseminated (prior to the corrective adver-
tisements, U-Haul only advertised in telephone book yellow pages),
other courts have ordered that offending advertising, labeling, or
package inserts be recalled. 9° Courts have also ordered affirmative
injunctions requiring letters to consumers or disclosures in future
advertising to correct previous advertisements.91
D. Other Private'Litigation
Under common law, competitors can sue for the torts of passing
off, product disparagement, and trade defamation (statements not
about the plaintiff's product, but about the plaintiff's integrity or
character).92 Passing off can be enjoined after the plaintiff proves a
likelihood of consumer confusion, secondary meaning of product or
package design, and nonfunctionality of the design or packaging.93
The courts typically will not order an injunction for disparagement
and defamation, and will only award special damages in disparage-
ment cases when they are proven with considerable specificity. 94
The plaintiff in a disparagement case also has the burden of proving
84 Keller, supra note 11, at 244.
85 PLEVAN & SIROKY, supra note 65, at 24-25.
86 Keller, supra note 11, at 244.
87 Id. at 26.
88 Id.
89 Best, supra note 24, at 19. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v.Jartran, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1238 (D.
Ariz. 1981), aft'd, 681 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1982), damages awarded, 601 F. Supp. 1140 (D.
Ariz. 1984), aff'd in part, modified in part, and rev'd in part, 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986), is
the only false advertising case to award damages. PLEVAN & SIROKY, supra note 65, at 50.
The cases cited by Best also involve trademark infringement issues. Best, supra note 24.
90 Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 646 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1981).
91 PLEVAN & SIROKY, supra note 65, at 38-46.
92 See, e.g., Ellen R. Jordan & Paul H. Rubin, An Economic Analysis of the Law of False
Advertising, 8J. LEGAL STUD. 527 (1979); PLEVAN & SIROKY, supra note 65, at 363-92.
93 See In re Application of Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 502-03 (C.C.P.A.
1961); Rolls-Royce Motors, Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ga.
1977); In re Certain Surveying Devices, 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 5409, 5420-21 (1981).
94 Note, Developments in the Law: Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 893 (1964).
[VOL. 17
IMPORT ADVERTISING
that the allegedly disparaging claims were false and made with mal-
ice.9 5 Thus, these torts only cover limited types of false advertising
and are difficult to prove. 96
Occasional antitrust cases have challenged advertising under
section two of the Sherman Act's prohibition against monopolizing
and attempts to monopolize. 9 7 The plaintiff must prove that the de-
fendant has an intent to monopolize, a high level of market power,
and that the advertising is anticompetitive. 98 A few courts have
found that "massive" advertising in conjunction with other anticom-
petitive conduct violates the antitrust laws. 99 Other cases have rec-
ognized this possibility, but have failed to find liability.10 0 Courts
also have found antitrust liability where the defendant has dispar-
aged the plaintiff's product.' 0 ' Lastly, courts have condemned the
introduction and advertising of "new" products called fighting
brands, targeted at rival products and often attempting to be
"passed off" as them.10 2
III. International Trade Commission Procedures and Cases
In 1974, sixty years after the establishment of the Federal Trade
Commission, the federal agency primarily responsible for advertising
regulation, Congress transformed the U.S. Tariff Commission, a
purely investigatory agency, into the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission (ITC), an agency with investigatory and adjudicative author-
ity.' 0 3 This section first explains the procedures of the ITC as




97 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
98 See Ross D. Petty, Predatory Promotion: A Theory of Antitrust Liability Whose Time Has
Come?, 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 215 (1989).
99 See Mount Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa.
1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969). For cases involving "massive" advertising, price-
cutting, and other anticompetitive practices, see American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946); Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co.,
30 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858 (1929); In re Golden Grain Macaroni
Co., 78 F.T.C. 63, 66-67 (1971).
100 See, e.g., Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1023 (1988); Purex Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 596 F.2d 881, 889-90 (9th
Cir. 1979), appeal after remand, 664 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983
(1982); Bailey's Bakery Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705, 720 (D. Hawaii
1964), aff'd, 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969). For a case
nearly identical to Mount Lebanon Motors, where liability was denied, see Rea v. Ford Motor
Co., 497 F.2d 577, 590 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974).
101 See, e.g., Multiflex v. Sam Moore, 709 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1100 (1984); International Travel v. Western Airlines, 623 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1063 (1980); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1971).
102 See Ross D. Petty, Antitrust and Innovation: Are Product Modifications Ever Predatory?, 22
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 997 (1988).
103 VAKERICS, supra note 8, at 6.
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A. International Trade Commission Procedures
To challenge the advertising of imported goods, a complainant
must file a complaint with the ITC containing far greater detail than
the "notice" type complaint that a federal court would allow to initi-
ate a Lanham Act lawsuit.' °4 The ITC complaint must include facts
that constitute an unfair method of competition or unfair act, includ-
ing descriptions of known instances of the unlawful act and the
names and addresses of the parties responsible for it.105 The com-
plaint must also define and describe the domestic injury caused by
the practices and contain both the theory of injury and the factual
basis establishing the injury, such as a reduction in profits or volume
of sales. '0 6 The ITC's Office of Unfair Import Investigations is avail-
able to assist in drafting the complaint and to discuss the complaint
with the plaintiff before it is filed.' 0 7
Informal investigation by the Office occurs during the thirty day
period after the complaint is filed to assist the ITC in deciding
whether to institute a formal investigation.' 0 8 The ITC must hold a
public meeting and make that decision before the thirty day period
lapses.109 Unlike the FTC, the ITC begins investigation proceedings
in any case where a complaint has been properly filed. 110 The pro-
ceeding or trial is conducted by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
under rules similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that gov-
ern court trials. Unlike court trials, however, an Investigative Attor-
ney is assigned to facilitate accurate and useful discovery and, after
discovery, to advocate an independent position on the issues before
the ALJ and the Commission."'
After discovery, the ALJ conducts a trial and makes an initial
determination concerning the alleged violations." 2 The Commis-
sion then determines whether to review the ALJ's determination or
merely adopt it as its own.1 13 The Commission holds its own hear-
ings focusing on whether to review the ALJ's decision as well as
whether the public interest favors imposing a remedy and what form
the remedy should take. The ITC must complete its investigation
and make its determination on liability and recommendation on a
remedy within one year or, "in more complicated cases," within
eighteen months of the Federal Register announcement of the inves-
104 See VAKERICS, supra note 8, at 512.
105 19 C.F.R. § 210.20 (1991).
106 Id.
107 See VAKERICS, supra note 8, at 514.
108 Id.
109 19 C.F.R. § 210.12 (1991).
110 VAKERICS, supra note 8, at 518.
III See Donald Knox Duvall, FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION ACTIONS: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE UNDER SECTION 337 OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930 649-52 (1991).




tigation." 1 4 The President then has sixty days to review and approve
or disapprove the determination of liability. 1 5 Of course, judicial
review of final ITC determinations and recommendations is available
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 16
Section 337 dictates that the primary remedy of the ITC in un-
fair methods of competition cases is an order excluding the products
in question from entry into U.S. commerce.' '7 It states that the ITC
"shall direct that the articles concerned, imported by any person vio-
lating the provision of this section, be excluded from entry into the
United States ... ."118 The ITC may decide not to order exclusion if
such an order would be contrary to the public interest,' 19 or it may
limit its order to only the products of certain importers rather than
all such products.' 2 0 The ITC has broad discretion in formulating
the appropriate remedy.' 2' It may also order that goods be tempo-
rarily excluded during the pendency of its proceeding to the same
extent that federal district courts may order temporary relief.' 2 2 Be-
cause these orders operate against goods, it is not necessary for the
ITC to have personal jurisdiction over the respondents, who are fre-
quently foreign businesses. 12
3
Exclusion orders seem appropriate in cases where the violation
is directly related to the product or its packaging: patent, trademark,
or copyright infringement; passing off; or the misappropriation of
trade dress. Advertising, however, as opposed to labeling and pack-
aging, is separate and distinct from the product. It therefore may be
more appropriate in some advertising cases for the ITC to issue a
cease and desist order against the unlawful conduct. 124 Such an or-
der is enforceable in federal district court, with a penalty for non-
compliance being the greater of $100,000 or twice the domestic
value of the goods per day of violation. 12 5
Because section 337 creates a right to relief "in addition to any
other provision of law,"' 126 it is important to note that a complainant
114 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1988).
''5 Id. § 1337(j)(2).
116 Id. § 1337(c).
117 Id. § 1337(d).
118 Id.
19' Id.
120 See David S. Nance, Relieffrom Unfair Import Practices Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930: An Overview, 13 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 493, 516-17 (1988).
121 Id. at 514-17.
122 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(3).
123 See Sealed Air Corp v. U.S.I.T.C., 645 F.2d 976, 985 (C.C.P.A. 1981). For a discus-
sion of ITC jurisdiction, see Janet D. Saxon & Paul A. Newhouse, Section 337Jurisdiction and
the Forgotten Remedy, 9 CAMPBELL L. REv. 45 (1986).
124 19 U.S.C. § 1337(0(1). Cease and desist orders have rarely been used by the ITC.
See Saxon & Newhouse, supra note 123, at 61.
125 19 U.S.C. § 1137(0(2).
126 Id. § 1337(a). The courts have been reluctant to enjoin parties from also partici-
pating in a section 337 proceeding. David I. Wilson & George E. Hovanec, Jr., The Growing
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may file for relief from false advertising concurrently with the ITC
and a district court. This raises the issue of whether ITC determina-
tions will be given res judicata effect in other proceedings. Patent-
based 337 proceedings are not given res judicata effect because dis-
trict courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent validity. 127 On
the otherhand, the Second Circuit recently decided to give res judi-
cata effect to ITC determinations in trademark infringement
cases.' 28 Although this issue has yet to be addressed in the context
of a false advertising case, it appears likely that district courts would
follow the Second Circuit's reasoning in the trademark situation.
B. Proving a Section 337 Violation
A complainant in a section 337 proceeding must prove (1) an
unfair method of competition or unfair act in the importation into or
sale of imported articles in the United States, and (2) that the threat
or effect of the act is to (a) "destroy or substantially injure an indus-
try in the United States," (b) prevent its establishment, or (c) "re-
strain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States."' 2 9
All sorts of practices have been found unfair under the first criterion
including false advertising, as detailed below.130 The proof of injury
merits discussion.
The first step in proving injury is defining the domestic indus-
try.' 3 ' If the U.S. manufacturing is significant and distinct from any
overseas manufacturing, then a domestic industry exists.132 Even
without domestic manufacturing, a domestic industry may exist if do-
mestic services such as quality control, packaging, installation, and
warranty service substantially add to the value of the product. 33
Once the domestic industry is defined, the ITC considers several
factors in making its determination of injury to that industry: (1) lost
sales or customers; (2) underpricing by imports; (3) significant mar-
ket penetration by imports; (4) declining profits, employment, or
production in the domestic industry; and (5) large foreign produc-
Importance of Trademark Litigation Before the International Trade Commission Under Section 337, 76
TRADEMARK REP. 1, 2 n.8 (1986).
127 See W.A. Baum Co. v. Propper Mfg. Co., 343 F. Supp. 1016, 1019 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
128 Union Mfg. Co. v. Han Baek Trading Co., 763 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1985).
129 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(l)(A) (1988).
IS0 For a general discussion of types of practices, see Nance, supra note 120, at 496-
506.
131 See VAKERICS, supra note 8, at 498. "Absent a showing of domestic industry, the
ITC has no jurisdiction to hear a 337 case, and the complaint will be dismissed." Id.
132 See Schaper Mfg. Co. v. U.S.I.T.C., 717 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
133 Id.(finding no domestic industry); In re Certain Products with Gremlins Character
Depictions, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1585 (Mar. 1986)(no domestic industry); In re Certain Cube
Puzzles, 4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2102 (1982)(domestic industry based on rigorous domestic
quality control); In re Certain Air-Tight Cast Iron Stoves, 3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1785 (Jan.
1981)(domestic industry found based on advertising and servicing).
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tion capacity with intent to increase U.S. sales.' 3 4 Only a few cases
have found no injury to domestic industry.13 5
C. ITC Advertising Cases
The vast majority (sixteen) of section 337 complaints alleging
false advertising have been withdrawn prior to adjudication so that
the specific details of the advertising allegations have not been re-
ported.' 3 6 In three additional cases, decisions published prior to the
withdrawal or settlement of the advertising claims indicate the spe-
cific allegations. In Certain Insulated Security Chests, the complainant al-
leged it had documented tests that disproved advertising claims that
the chest could withstand temperatures of " 1550 degrees F" for "up
to 30 minutes."13 7 In Certain Single Handle Faucets, the complainant
initially challenged, but did not pursue, claims that the imported fau-
cets had been "proven dependable in millions of installation
[sic].'1 3 8 This claim was challenged as both false advertising and as
evidence that the importer was attempting to pass off its faucets as
being those of the complainant.' 3 9 Finally, in Certain Limited Charge
Cell Culture Microcarriers, the complainants withdrew false advertising
charges concerning price comparisons and the origin of the technol-
134 See Nance, supra note 120, at 512; VAKERICS, supra note 8, at 503-06; Wilson &
Hovanec, supra note 128, at 6-7.
135 See VAKERICS, supra note 8, at 505-06.
136 See In re Certain Strip Lights, Inv. No. 337-TA-287, 54 Fed. Reg. 14874 (Apr. 13,
1989)(allegations withdrawn); In re Certain Laser Inscribed Diamonds and the Method of
Inscription, Inv. No. 337-TA-240, 51 Fed. Reg. 33935 (Sept. 24, 1986)(settlement agree-
ment); In re Certain Upper Body Protector Apparatus for Use in Motorsports, Inv. No.
337-TA-234, 51 Fed. Reg. 44536 (Dec. 10, 1986)(settlement agreement); In re Certain Key
Telephone Systems and Components, Inv. No. 337-TA-223, 50 Fed. Reg. 50849 (Dec. 12,
1985)(complaint withdrawn); In re Certain Automatic Bowling Machine Printed Circuit
Control Boards, Inv. No. 337-TA-218, 50 Fed. Reg. 37918 (Sept. 18, 1985)(consent order
agreement); In re Certain Pull-Type Golf Carts and Wheels Therefor, Inv No. 337-TA-204,
50 Fed. Reg. 16170 (Apr. 24, 1985)(complaint withdrawn); In re Certain Anodes for Ca-
thodic Protection and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA- 199, 50 Fed. Reg. 10116
(Mar. 13, 1985)(settlement agreement); In re Certain Softballs and Polyurethane Cores
Therefor, Inv. No. 337-TA-190, Pub. 1751 (Apr. 1985)(allegations withdrawn); In re Cer-
tain Glass Construction Blocks, Inv. No. 337-TA-187, 50 Fed. Reg. 6073 (Feb. 13, 1985);
In re Certain Metal and Wire Shelf Products and Accessories, Inv. No. 337-TA-175, 49
Fed. Reg. 29161 (July 18, 1984)(complaint withdrawn); In re Certain Poultry Cut Up Ma-
chines, Inv. No. 337-TA-159, 49 Fed. Reg. 15288 (Apr. 18, 1984)(terminated on the basis
of two consent orders); In re Certain Radar Detectors and Accompanying Owner's Manu-
als, Inv. No. 337-TA-149, 49 Fed. Reg. 2168 (Jan. 18, 1984)(settlement agreement); In re
Certain Copper-Clad Stainless Steel Cookware, Inv. No. 337-TA-141, 48 Fed. Reg. 44279
(Sept. 28, 1983)(variety of reasons); In re Certain Marine Hardware and Accessories, Inv.
No. 337-TA-136, 48 Fed. Reg. 20164 (May 4, 1983)(settlement agreement); In re Certain
Thermal Conductivity Sensing Gem Testers and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-
100, 47 Fed. Reg. 17134 (Apr. 21, 1982)(settlement agreement); In re Certain Alternating
Pressure Pads, Inv. No. 337-TA-48, 44 Fed. Reg. 12286 (Mar. 6, 1979)(complaint
withdrawn).
i37 Inv. No. 337-TA-244, 1986 ITC LEXIS 155 (June 17, 1986)(ALJ decision to
amend the complaint).
138 6 I.T.R.D (BNA) 1470, 1484 (Nov. 1984).
'39 Id.
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ogy in question. 140 Thus, in nineteen cases, the false advertising al-
legations were settled or withdrawn.' 4 '
The remaining ITC advertising cases fall into four categories.
First, five cases pled false advertising, but really had no separate
cause of action beyond passing off or false designation of origin. 142
Similarly, three other cases alleged misappropriation of a picture of
the complainant's product used in the respondent's advertisement,
which is essentially passing off or false designation of origin.' 43
While false advertising, broadly defined, would certainly include
such practices, these eight cases offer little precedential value for
false advertising cases generally.
The second category of false advertising cases consists of only
one early case where the ITC found infringement of a patent as a
basis for an exclusion order but did not reach a determination on the
false advertising count.1 44 In a separate opinion, Vice Chairman Al-
benger and Commissioner Stern suggested that the advertising claim
"'as seen on TV" had not clearly been proven false by the
complainant. 145
The third category is comprised of cases where false advertising
was found, but failed to meet the requirements of section 337. In
two other cases, the ITC found that false claims of either actual or
pending U.S. patent protection constituted false advertising, but
found no section 337 violation because of insufficient proof of injury
to the domestic industry.' 46 Similarly, in Certain Compound Action
Metal Cutting Snips, the ITC found that a false claim that snips had
molybdenum blades constituted false advertising, but also held that
140 Inv. No. 337-TA-129, 1983 ITC LEXIS 80 (Mar. 14, 1983)(ALJ decision).
141 In one other case, the ITC Administrative Law Judge noted false advertising about
a product's chemical content that was not challenged. See In re Certain Minoxodil Powder,
Salts and Compositions For Use in Hair Treatment, Inv No. 337-TA-267, 1988 ITC LEXIS
19 (Feb. 16, 1988).
142 In re Certain Electric Power Tools, Battery Cartridges and Battery Chargers, Inv.
No. 337-TA-284, 54 Fed. Reg. 31896 (Aug. 2, 1989)(finding no liability for false advertis-
ing/passing off); In re Certain Nut Jewelry, 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1595 (Nov. 1986)(exclusion
order issued for products falsely labelled to imply hawaiian origin); In re Certain Caulking
Guns, 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1432 (Feb. 1984)(use of cut-away drawing held not to be false
advertising/false designation of origin); In re Certain Power Woodworking Tools, Inv No.
337-TA- 115, 1983 LEXIS 22 (1983)(ALJ merges claim of false advertising with claim of
false designation of origin); In re Certain Surveying Devices, 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 5409, 5418-
21 (Jul. 1980)(false advertising count discussed with passing off and false designation of
origin).
143 In re Certain Apparatus for Installing Electrical Lines, 7 I.T.R,D. (BNA) 1869 (June
1985); In re Certain Heavy Duty Staple Gun Tackers, 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1623 (Feb. 1984);
In re Certain Novelty Glasses, 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 5400 (July 1979).
144 In re Certain Rotary Scraping Tools, 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 5233 (Jan. 1980).
145 Id.
146 In re Certain Vertical Milling Machines, 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1259 (Mar. 1984), aff'd.,
Textron, Inc v. ITC, 753 F.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1985)(use of complainant's product photo-




"there are no confusing similarities between these products and
those of complainant which could give rise to injury or tendency to
injure complainant, as required by section 337."147 In one addi-
tional case, the ITC found that the use of a picture of the complain-
ant's product in the respondent's advertisement and a false logo for
Underwriters Labs constituted false advertising, but held that no
proof existed of importation into the U.S.14 8 The complainant later
sued and obtained an injunction against these and other practices in
federal district court under the Lanham Act. 149
Lastly, the ITC found that false advertising did constitute a vio-
lation of section 337 in two cases involving claims that the imported
product was equivalent to the domestic product.'50 In both cases,
the importers were attempting to compete with dominant firms in
the product market.' 51 It is not unusual for small competitors to
claim equivalency to the market leader under these circumstances
(the marketing literature refers to this tactic as an associative
claim).15 2 These cases also successfully challenged the importers for
passing off.15 3
The earlier of these two cases was the first in which the ITC
discussed its authority over false advertising. In Certain Airtight Cast
Iron Stoves, the complainant challenged stoves imported from Taiwan
that copied non-functional features ofJotul brand stoves from Scan-
dinavia as violating a common law trademark on those features.' 54 It
also challenged these imports for falsely advertising their origin and
their equivalency to Scandinavian stoves. 15 The ITC cited both the
Lanham and FTC acts as authorities for finding that these false ad-
vertising claims constituted unfair competition under section 337.156
An interesting issue in this precedent-setting case was the Com-
mission's interpretation of the terms "domestic industry" and
"proof of injury."' 157 Although the complainant's products were
manufactured in Norway, the Commission found there to be a do-
mestic industry in the sale, installation, and servicing of these stoves
147 In re Certain Compound Action Metal Cutting Snips, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1307, 1325
(Mar. 1986).
148 In re Certain Miniature Plug-In Blade Fuses, 4 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2417, 2432 (Jan.
1983).
149 See Littlefuse, Inc. v. Parker, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 654 (N.D. I11. 1986).
150 In re Certain Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves, 3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1158 (Dec. 1980); In re
Certain Plastic Food Storage Containers, 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2133 (Aug. 1984).
151 See infra note 155.
152 See, e.g., Debra Scammon, Comparative Advertising: A Reexamination of the Issues, 12 J.
CONSUMER AFFAIRS 381, 387 (1978).
153 In re Certain Plastic Food Storage Containers, 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2133 (Aug. 1984);
In re Certain Airtight Cast Iron Stoves, 3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1158 (Dec. 1980)(also false ad-
vertising of origin).
15 3 I.T.R.D. at 1159.
155 Id. at 1160.
156 Id. at 1159-60.
157 Id. at 1161-63.
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by U.S. firms and workers.' 5 8 It also found this domestic industry to
be injured by the challenged practices since imports were obtaining
significant market penetration. 5
9
The copying of non-functional features in Cast Iron Stoves also
were challenged as a restraint of trade under the antitrust laws.' 6 °
Despite finding injury to the domestic industry, the ITC found no
evidence of concerted action and no suppression of competition suf-
ficient to constitute a restraint of trade.16 ' Thus, while the ITC's
antitrust analysis appears sketchy, its finding of no antitrust liability
is consistent with other antitrust cases that have only found liability
when the advertising was "massive" or disparaging.' 62
Two other points about this decision bear mentioning. First, the
Commission failed to reconcile its findings that the Taiwanese stoves
were both being passed off as Jotul stoves and being falsely adver-
tised as equivalent to them.' 63 The former illegal practice tells con-
sumers they are Jotul stoves; the latter says they are not, but are just
as good.' 64 Whether both claims can be communicated to consum-
ers simultaneously is not explained by the decision.
Second, while the decision cites to FTC precedent, it omits any
reference to a famous FTC decision that appears analogous. In In re
Heinz B. Kirchner,'6 5 the Federal Trade Commission noted its respon-
sibility to protect the gullible and credulous consumer, but stated
that it would not hold advertisers liable for every conceivable inter-
pretation of the advertising, such as those that might be made by the
"foolish or feebleminded."'166 The example that the FTC presented
of an "outlandish" interpretation was the view that Denmark was the
source of all Danish pastries. 16 7 Perhaps Scandinavian stoves do not
hold the same sort of generic meaning for consumers as do Danish
pastries, but the ITC did not discuss this issue.
The second ITC case to find section 337 liability for false adver-
tising is In re Certain Plastic Food Storage Containers.168 The complain-
158 Id. at 1162.
159 Id. at 1163.
160 Id. at 1160.
161 Id. at 1161.
162 See supra notes 98-101. In In re Certain Electrically Resistive Monocomponent
Toner, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1672 (Mar. 1988), the ALJ found the respondent liable under
section 337 for the maintenance of monopoly power through disparagement -referring
to its rivals as "pirates." The Commission reversed stating that the ALJ improperly re-
versed the burden of proof by forcing the respondent to disprove injury rather than re-
quiring the complainant to prove it. The ITC found there was no proof that the
disparagement was exclusionary and dismissed the case. Id. at 1676-77.
163 Certain Aurtight Cast Iron Stoves, 3 I.T.R.D. at 1159-60.
164 Id. at 1160.
165 See In re Heinz B. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963), aft'd, 337 F.2d 731 (9th Cir.
1964).
166 Heinz B. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. at 1290.
167 Id.
168 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2133 (Aug. 1984).
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ant, who made Tupperware brand storage containers, based its false
advertising cause of action solely on the Lanham Act. It alleged, and
the Administrative Law Judge found (these findings were adopted by
the Commission), that the advertising claims of "interchangeability"
with Tupperware were false because even though the products fit to-
gether, Tupperware had conducted tests which proved that its prod-
ucts sealed better and were more resistant to impact and warpage. 169
The decision follows Lanham Act precedent of not requiring proof
of how consumers would interpret the advertising claims because
they were found to be literally false.' 70 The decision adopts a dic-
tionary definition of interchangeability, "mutual substitution without
loss of function or suitability," without considering whether in this
advertising context consumers would limit the advertising claim to fit
rather than also including quality. 1
7 1
The remedy ordered by the ITC in both of these cases was the
exclusion of products that violated complainants' trademarks. In Cast
Iron Stoves, the order was a broad exclusion order since the copying
of nonfunctional features violated common law trademarks. 172 In
Tupperware, the exclusion order was limited to those products in
packaging that used the Tupperware name or trademark.' 7 3 In both
cases, the ITC issued cease and desist orders against the false adver-
tising as well.
In summary, while occasionally false advertising charges before
the ITC involve advertising claims completely distinct from allega-
tions of passing off or false designation or origin (e.g., "can with-
stand temperatures..." and "molybdenum blades,") these cases are
rare. Still rarer are cases where the ITC has actually ordered the
cessation of false advertising. Therefore, the ITC has not yet be-
come an agency for addressing general problems of false advertising
for imports.
IV. Unresolved Section 337 Issues
The ITC cases that analyze advertising issues suggest three ar-
eas of concern. First, in areas where FTC law differs from Lanham
Act jurisprudence, which should the ITC follow? 174 Second, how
should the ITC approach section 337's requirement of injury to a
domestic industry in an advertising case and should it also consider
consumer interests in determining the injury? 175 Third, what reme-
169 Id. at 2147.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 3 I.T.R.D. at 1164.
173 6 I.T.R.D. at 2134-35.
174 See infra notes 183-94 and accompanying text.
175 See infra notes 195-213 and accompanying text.
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dies are appropriate in ITC advertising cases? 176 Each of these is-
sues will be discussed in turn.
A. Federal Trade Commission or Lanham Act Precedent
While Cast Iron Stoves approvingly adopts precedent under both
the FTC and Lanham Acts, 77 most ITC advertising cases only dis-
cuss precedent under the Lanham Act. 178 This appears to be the
more appropriate standard for the ITC because despite participation
by the Commission Investigative Attorney, 179 it primarily functions
like a federal district court hearing a case litigated by private par-
ties. 180 Furthermore, also like a court, it is required to initiate, inves-
tigate, and hear every case that is properly filed before it.181 In
contrast, the FTC staff acts as complaint counsel in its administrative
proceedings. It only initiates cases where it has reason to believe the
FTC Act has been violated and that are in the public interest.' 82
Although the majority of ITC advertising cases appear to adopt
Lanham Act precedent, in Certain Caulking Guns, the ITC appears
closer to adopting FTC precedent. 183 The ITC stated that it did not
need evidence of consumer advertising interpretation; it could de-
cide for itself whether advertising was unfair or deceptive. 84 This
holding implies that the ITC has advertising expertise comparable to
the FTC. 18 5 Most courts in Lanham Act cases will only interpret ex-
press claims, not implied ones, without evidence of consumer inter-
pretation. 186 The ITC cited its earlier decision in Cast Iron Stoves as
precedent for its holding even though that decision contains no au-
thority for such a holding beyond the explicit false use of pictures of
Jotul stoves in the respondents' advertising and the false description
of the Taiwanese stoves as Scandinavian. 187 The language in Caulk-
ing Guns is not as troubling as it first appears when the entire decision
is examined. The complainant alleged that respondents' use of cut-
away drawings of caulking guns would confuse consumers since the
complainant first used this common advertising technique in the
176 See infra notes 214-25 and accompanying text.
177 See also In re Certain Nut Jewelry, 9 I.T.R.D. 1595, 1598 (Nov. 1986)(citing both
FTC and Lanham Act precedent).
178 See, e.g., In re Certain Vertical Milling Machines, 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1259, 1274-76
(Mar. 1984); In re Certain Caulking Guns, 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1432, 1452-53; In re Certain
Plastic Food Storage Containers, 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 2147-48.
179 See supra note Ill and accompanying text.
180 VAKERICS, supra note 8, at 522.
181 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1988).
182 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1988).
183 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1432, 1452 (1984).
184 Id. at 1453.
185 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
186 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
187 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1453.
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caulking gun market. 188 The ITC held that the complainant had not
proven consumer confusion and held that false advertising therefore
had not been proven. Liability was found only for patent infringe-
ment.' 8 9 Thus, while the ITC suggested it had expertise like the
FTC to interpret advertising without evidence of consumer interpre-
tation, it declined to find liability in the absence of such evidence. 19 0
As this Article makes clear, the ITC has reviewed so few advertising
cases that its expertise level is more akin to that of a district court
than the FTC.
This analysis also suggests that the ITC should not adopt the
FTC doctrine of advertising substantiation.'19 Under this doctrine
the FTC requires advertisers to have a "reasonable basis" for their
advertising claims. 19 2 The FTC may stop any advertising that lacks
such a basis without proving the claims are false.' 9 3 Rather it should
require complainants to prove the falsity of the advertising just as
most courts in Lanham Act cases have done when faced with this
issue. Most Lanham Act courts have rejected this doctrine because it
is contrary to the language of the statute and because the courts are
skeptical of their own expertise and of the plaintiff's private interest
in stopping a rival's advertising where the advertising is not proven
false. 194
B. Proving Injury and Consumer Interest
Two troubling findings of this Article stand in stark contrast to
each other and emphasize the ITC's need to develop a consistent
standard for proving industry injury. First, the only two cases where
the ITC ordered advertising claims to cease, Cast Iron Stoves and Food
Storage Containers, involved associative claims by small marketers of-
fering consumers a lower priced alternative to the market leader.' 9 5
The ITC found industry injury and condemned these ads without
extrinsic evidence of whether consumers were likely to be deceived
by the ads (i.e., passing off had occurred) or whether consumers un-
derstood the ads to make comparability claims. 19 6
Second, in several other cases where the ITC found advertising
claims to be false, it failed to order their cessation because it rejected
industry injury arguments based on lost sales. 197 Thus, it rejected
the arguments that it had accepted in Cast Iron Stoves and Food Storage
188 Id. at 1452.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
192 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
193 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
194 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 150-73.
196 See supra notes 163-64, 170.
197 See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
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Containers. 198
In Certain Vertical Milling Machines, 19 9 for example, the ITC found
a number of instances of false advertising, including the use of trade
names that infringed ,on the complainant's trademarks, the -use of a
photograph of complainant's product in advertising that purported it7
was respondent's product, and a false claim of patent protection.2 0 0
The ITC noted a decrease in complainant's sales and an increase in
sales of imported products, but attributed these market changes to
complainant's price increase and a general decrease in the price of
imports. 20 ' The vast majority of imported machines were marketed
by companies that had not engaged in any unfair acts, and the Com-
mission held that there was "no direct evidence that ... the unfair
acts [had] caused substantial injury to the domestic industry. 20 2
While this holding justifies not issuing a general exclusion order
against all such vertical milling machines, it is a narrow interpreta-
tion of section 337's requirement of proof that "the threat or effect
of which [unfair act] is ... to destroy or substantially injure an indus-
try in the United States."12 03 The holding does not explain the Com-
mission's reluctance to issue a cease and desist order against
particular companies to cover the challenged practices.
In the past, the ITC has interpreted its authority more broadly
to cover conceivable lost sales. 20 4 Such an interpretation is more
consistent with the Lanham Act, 20 5 which requires that the plaintiff
prove that the defendant's advertisement "likely" has caused or will
cause injury to the plaintiff.2 0 6 Likely injury is presumed in cases of
comparative advertising.2 0 7 Proof of actual lost sales caused by the
advertising is required to obtain an award of damages, but not re-
quired for injunctive relief.2 0 8
A liberal interpretation of the proof of injury requirement is also
consistent with recent congressional concerns. Prior to the passage
198 See 3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1158; 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2133.
199 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1259 (1984).
200 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1274-75. See also In re Certain Solder Removal Wicks, 582 F.2d
628 (C.C.P.A. 1978)(false advertising claims of "patent pending" held not injurious).
201 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1276.
202 Id.
203 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(l)(A) (1988).
204 H. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1974)(relying on In re Von Clemm, 229
F.2d 441 (C.C.P.A. 1955)). But see In re Certain Headboxes and Papermaking Machine
Forming Sections for the Continuous Production of Paper and Components Thereof, Inv.
No. 337-TA-82, Pub. No. 1138 at 18 (1981)(dissenting Commissioner asserting the report
"is not an expression of Congressional intent that any conceivable lost sale established a
tendency to substantially injure.").
205 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
206 See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir.
1980).





of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,209 the
House Ways and Means Committee suggested that this requirement
might unduly discourage proper complainants from filing section
337 cases before the ITC and estimated that half of the litigation
costs of a section 337 case are devoted to proving this element. 210
For this reason, the 1988 Act eliminated the injury requirement for
cases involving statutory intellectual property matters. 211 This
amendment, however, did not affect cases alleging false advertising.
To become an effective agency against false advertising, the ITC
must develop consistent standards for proving injury. Since the Lan-
ham Act does require some proof of likely injury,212 completely elim-
inating the requirement of injury is too extreme. The statute could
be amended to be consistent with the Lanham Act case law or the
ITC could simply decide to follow earlier precedent to be consistent
with the Lanham Act. In either event, the ITC should strive to con-
sistently consider the consumer benefits from competition in deter-
mining whether the industry is injured by the alleged false
advertising. 213
C. Remedies
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 made im-
portant clarifications to the ITC's remedial authority under section
337. First, it imposes deadlines of 90 days (or 150 days in compli-
cated cases) for the granting of temporary relief, comparable to a
district court preliminary injunction. 2 14 These deadlines were added
to prevent the ITC from unduly delaying temporary relief, but Con-
gress anticipated that the ITC would still conduct a hearing before
granting such relief (unlike a district court temporary restraining or-
der).215 Second, the Act empowers the ITC to require the complain-
ant to post a bond before ordering temporary relief.21 6 This step
limits the harassment of respondents through temporary relief.2 17
Third, the Act raises the maximum penalty for violating cease and
209 Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
210 H. REP. No. 100-40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 156 (1987).
211 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B),(C), (D) (1988).
212 See supra notes 84-89.
213 For example, the FTC has extolled the virtues of comparative advertising including
associative claims. See 16 C.F.R. § 14.15 (1989); Dee Pridgen & Ivan L. Preston, Enhancing
the Flow of Information in the Marketplace: From Caveat Emptor to Virginia Pharmacy and Beyond at
the Federal Trade Commission, 14 GA. L. REV. 635, 673-79 (1980). The FTC rarely challenges
comparative advertising claims, particularly those that explicitly name the competitor. See
Ross D. Petty, The Evolution of Comparative Advertising Law: Has the Lanham Act Gone Too Far?,
10 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING (forthcoming 1991)(less than 20% of recent FTC cases
challenge comparative claims, but over half of Lanham Act lawsuits challenge such claims).
214 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(2) (1988).
215 See H. REP. No. 100-40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. at 115 (1987).
216 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(3).
217 See H. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 635-36 (1988).
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desist orders and settles an internal ITC debate by clarifying that
such orders may be imposed in addition to exclusion orders. 218
Yet despite these amendments, remedial questions remain. It
has not yet been decided, though it seems likely, that the ITC can use
its cease and desist authority to order affirmative information disclo-
sures or corrective advertising. Both the FTC and the Lanham Act
courts have imposed such orders under similar remedial author-
ity. 219 In contrast, there is no authority for the ITC to order con-
sumer refunds or competitor damages.
The ITC also needs to limit the role of exclusion orders in false
advertising cases. It likely will not be in the public interest to com-
pletely exclude products, otherwise legally imported, merely because
they are falsely advertised here. 220 This remedy goes far beyond
those under the FTC or Lanham Acts.2 21
A final issue involves false advertising in a domestic context.
One could question whether the ITC should intervene at all in a
purely domestic false advertising case, where the domestic importer,
not a foreign firm, is responsible for false advertising. In cases like
Cast Iron Stoves, the ITC had no difficulty exercising jurisdiction over
domestic dealers who purchased the stoves from domestic distribu-
tors, but in that case the product itself violated a common law trade-
mark.2 22  In Cardiac Pacemakers & Components Thereof, the ALJ
dismissed a case involving imported components with significant
other uses beyond the pacemaker that allegedly infringed upon a
U.S. patent and held that no nexus existed between importation and
the unfair act.22"
It is not clear what the ITC would do in a case where the only
unfair practice concerning an imported product was its false adver-
tising by domestic dealers.224 In a carefully worded footnote, Vice
Chairman Liebeler has recognized this question, but reserved judge-
ment on it.225
V. Conclusion
Competitor challenges to advertisements today in many differ-
ent forums are commonplace. While the FTC considers advertising
218 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1) (1990). For a synopsis of the debate, see In re Certain Com-
pound Act Metal Cutting Snips, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1307, 1310-11 nn. 14-19; Saxon & New-
house, supra note 123, at 47 n.10.
219 See supra notes 55, 56, 61, 91 and accompanying text.
220 Moreover, the exclusion order is often ineffective. See Saxon & Newhouse, supra
note 123, at 59.
221 See supra notes 51-63, 82-89 and accompanying text.
222 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
223 Inv. No. 337-TA-162, ALJ Order No. 37 (1984).
224 In re Certain Apparatus for Installing Electrical Lines, 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1869,
1876.
225 See id. at 1876 n. 23.
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as often benefiting consumers, the ITC, like most Lanham Act
courts, fails to account for any such benefit. Given this similarity to
the Lanham Act, it is somewhat surprising that section 337's con-
demnation of "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts" has
not yet made the U.S. International Trade Commission anywhere
near as popular a forum as district courts under the Lanham Act. 226
The ITC has only considered false advertising as an adjunct to other
allegations of unfair practices such as trademark infringement, pass-
ing off, and false designation of origin. 227
There exist two possible explanations for the limited number of
ITC advertising actions. 228 First, in some cases, the Commission has
found no proof of injury to the domestic industry.2 29 These deci-
sions suggest a requirement that the complainant present a high
level of proof to show that the false advertising caused it to lose
sales.230 Such a difficult standard is more akin to common law re-
quirements that discouraged such suits rather than the more modem
Lanham Act standard for injunction cases. 23'
Second, when the majority of advertising for imported products
is done by the domestic firm that imported them rather than the for-
eign firm that manufactured them, the ITC has not stated whether it
will consider a suit only against the domestic importing firm. While
issuing an exclusion order against such products clearly is inappro-
priate, the ITC's cease and desist authority is roughly comparable to
remedies typically imposed by the FTC and Lanham Act district
courts. In such cases the ITC offers the litigants the advantage of
time limits to ensure that the case proceeds promptly. From the pro-
spective of public policy, the ITC has the advantage of Presidential
review and possible veto if foreign policy concerns merit such
action.232
Perhaps the simplest explanation for the small number of ITC
advertising cases is the lack of experience of advertising lawyers with
this forum and the lack of experience of the ITC bar with advertising
issues. Like the early years of the Lanham Act, time and gradual ex-
perience may correct these deficiencies. Indeed, perhaps with expe-
rience the ITC will develop a consistent treatment of industry injury
in advertising cases that explicitly examines the consumer benefits
from enhanced competition.
226 See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 143-44, 150.
228 See supra notes 136-73 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
230 See supra notes 197-204.
231 See supra notes 94, 205-08 and accompanying text.
232 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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